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Abstract: This paper advances the hypothesis that workers participate less in trade unions in more 
ethnically fragmented societies. This hypothesis dates back at least to Marx and Engels who first 
suggested that increased ethnic and racial antipathies among workers undermine class consciousness 
and weaken the unity of the working class in the United States. Building on a set of innovative 
instruments derived from biogeography and more precisely the parasite-stress theory of values and 
sociality (Fincher and Thornhill, 2008), our analysis seeks to exploit exogenous sources of variations 
in ethnic diversity and establish a convincing relationship between ethnic diversity and trade union 
density across countries. In turn, our analysis investigates the above mentioned relationship by using 
the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset and in particular a sample of migrants of different ancestry 
residing in ESS countries. Consistent with the prediction of the theory, both layers of the empirical 
analysis provide evidence of a strong, negative and highly significant relationship between ethnic 
diversity and the decision of the workers to participate in trade unions. Obtained empirical findings 
remain highly robust across a number of alternative empirical specifications and estimation 
techniques. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is widely accepted that ethnic diversity can have far reaching consequences for economic and political 
development within countries (see e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). Focusing on the provision of public goods, a large number of studies suggest that increased 
diversity reduces the amount of provided public goods both across countries and across communities within a 
country (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Stichnoth and Van de Straeten, 2009 for reviews of this literature).  
The cornerstone of this unpleasant, albeit widely observed fact, is that individuals are less willing to provide a 
good with public benefits if those benefits are directed to groups that share different racial, ethnic and linguistic 
characteristics.
1
  
 Following a similar rationale, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) investigate whether the participation of 
individuals in social groups is affected by the fact that a population may be heterogeneous in terms of race or 
ethnicity. Using survey data on group memberships from US localities, they suggest that participation in civil 
activities is significantly lower in more ethnically fragmented societies. These findings come as no surprise. 
According to Olson (1965) collective action presents public goods’ characteristics (i.e. each individual has an 
incentive to “free ride” on the efforts of the others if the collective action aims to provide non-excludable 
benefits to everybody). Thus, the effect of increased ethnic diversity on the participation in social groups is 
expected to be qualitatively similar to the effect of increased ethnic diversity on the provision of any type of 
public goods.  
 The paper at hand places the spotlight on a specific type of social group (namely, trade unions) and 
investigates whether workers participate less in trade unions in ethnically fragmented societies.
2
 This hypothesis 
dates back at least to Marx and Engels who first suggested that increased ethnic and racial diversity undermines 
class consciousness and weakens the unity of the working class in the United States.
3
 More recently, Lipset and 
Marks (2000) investigated how increased racial antipathies within the US are interrelated with the so-called 
“American Exceptionalism” and the corresponding reduced participation of American workers in trade unions. 
It is worth noting that craft unions in the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were organized along ethnic 
lines, encompassing native workers and “old” immigrants from Northern Europe and largely excluding “new” 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, along with Chinese and African-Americans. Similarly, Davis 
                                                          
1 One potential explanation for this effect is that different groups have different preferences or agendas for public spending and that this 
disagreement makes the provision of public goods more costly in heterogeneous communities (see Alesina et al., 1999). An alternative 
explanation is that altruism travels less across racial and ethnic lines and members of one racial or ethnic group naturally dislike members 
of other groups. The literature documenting prejudice, discrimination and ethnic hate is vast. Classics include Allport (1954) on the 
psychology of racial prejudice, Becker (1957) on the economics of discrimination as well as DuBois (1903) and Gilens (1999) on race 
relations and racial stereotypes in the United States. A slightly more nuanced view is that racial hate is endogenous to the political system 
and it is often created by politicians in order to serve specific political purposes (see e.g. Glaeser, 2005). 
2 According to Olson (1965), participation in trade unions constitute a very standard type of collective action. This is because trade 
unions provide non-excludable benefits to every single worker (e.g. a wage increase) independently on whether he/she helped bearing the 
costs.  
3  The view that working-class ethnic and racial diversity undermined class consciousness and weakened the socialistic political 
movements in America was put forward in 1870 by Karl Marx, who emphasized that American socialists should press for a coalition 
among workers of different ethnic backgrounds (see the letter of Marx to S. Meyer and A. Vogt, April 9, 1870 in Karl Marx (1973) pp. 
499-500). Similarly, Engels wrote a letter to Sorge, December 2, 1892, emphasizing that: “[…] the great obstacle in America, it seems to 
me, lies in the exceptional position of the native workers. […] The ordinary badly paid occupations are left to immigrants, of whom only 
a small section enters the aristocratic trade unions” (see Marx and Engels (1936)). 
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(1988) argues that conflicts among ethnic groups were particularly intense in the US labor market during the 
early 19
th
 century. Particularly, from the late 1830s, Irish immigrants entered the US labor market, which was 
formerly dominated by Germans, British and African-Americans. Irish workers were particularly successful 
partly because they were willing to work for lower wages than former immigrants (and even former slaves), and 
partly because the Irish had a strong sense of community that allowed them to exclude competing workers from 
other ethnic groups. Overall, the case of US labor market during the early 19
th
 century provides striking 
anecdotal evidence that strong antipathies among workers belonging to different ethnic groups weaken their 
participation in trade unions.
4
  
 This research aims to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and participation in trade 
unions using macro and micro datasets. More precisely, the analysis takes place in two layers exploiting 
exogenous variations in ethnic diversity across: (a) countries and (b) migrants of different ancestry within a 
country. In the first part of the analysis relies on cross-country data from 91 developed and developing countries 
and investigates the effect of ethnic and religious diversity on trade union density. To address the usual 
endogeneity concerns driven by the fact that both ethnic diversity and trade union density may be endogenous to 
economic and political institutions, we instrument ethnic diversity on a set of innovative epidemiological data 
that have been linked empirically to ethnic and religious diversity (see e.g. Cashdan, 2001; Fincher and 
Thornhill, 2008; 2012; 2014). More precisely, we employ as instruments the: (i)  combined parasite stress, (ii)  
non-zoo parasite stress developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) and (iii)  pathogen prevalence of infectious 
diseases data developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008). Epidemiological data are neither economic nor 
political in nature, thus they ensure a sufficient source of exogenous variation for ethnic diversity. Our empirical 
findings provide evidence of a negative, statistically significant and quantitatively important effect of ethnic 
diversity on trade union density, which remains robust across different specifications and estimation techniques. 
 In the second part, we re-examine the above mentioned hypothesis by using individual data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS). More precisely, our analysis builds on a set of 6880 –first generation– migrants 
from 116 countries of origin who reside in 32 European countries and employs the empirical specification 
suggested by Luttmer and Singhal (2011). This part of the analysis explores the effect of ethnic diversity in the 
birth country of a –first generation– migrant on his/her decision to participate in a trade union in the country of 
residence. Individual data allows us to account for a number of personal characteristics (such as age, gender, 
education, type of employment etc) but most importantly to introduce residence country fixed effects that are 
able to account for institutional and cultural characteristics of the country of residence. Empirical findings 
suggest that the decision of a worker to participate in trade unions is affected negatively by increased ethnic 
diversity in his/her birth country. Once again, our empirical findings remain robust and qualitatively intact 
across different specifications. 
                                                          
4
 In a parallel –albeit related- literature, focusing mainly on fiscal redistribution, Roemer (1998), Lee and Roemer (2006) and Roemer 
and Van der Straeten (2005; 2006) investigate the effect of adding a second dimension (such as race or religion) on the political conflict 
for redistribution. Their analysis suggests that the inclusion of a second racial dimension divides the group of agents that are in favor of 
redistribution (i.e. the relatively poor agents) and leads to a bundling effect that mitigates redistributive policies. This is because a share 
of the voters that are in favor of redistribution votes for a political party that advocates lower redistribution since they may agree with the 
party’s agenda on ethnic and racial issues. 
4 
 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds along the following lines. Section 2 discusses the economic 
argument upon which we base our empirical analysis. Section 3illustrates the data and identification strategy. 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and the economic argument 
A number of studies on diversity investigate the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the amount or 
distribution of public spending by governments or-more recently- on attitudes towards activities and goods that 
generate public benefits (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Stichnoth and Van de Straeten, 2011 for reviews of 
this literature). The main conclusion from this literature is that ethnically diverse communities spend less on 
social programs as a share of GDP (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Desmet et al., 2009), less on schools (Alesina et 
al., 2003, Goldin and Katz, 1999) and less on public infrastructure  (Alesina et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999).  
 Moreover, the relevant literature suggests that increased ethnic diversity exerts a negative impact on 
individual attitudes and behavior when public benefits are involved. Specifically, in ethnically heterogeneous 
communities, individuals express a stronger preference for decreasing social benefits (Dahlberg et al., 2012), 
contribute less to community organizations (Otken and Osili, 2004), contribute less to schools through voluntary 
fundraising events (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), are less likely to fill out census forms (Vidgor, 2004), donate 
less on private charities (Andreoni et al., 2016) and participate less on social groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000). There are several explanations for this unpleasant, albeit widely observed result. One potential 
explanation is that different groups have different preferences or agendas for public spending and that this 
disagreement makes the provision of public goods more costly in heterogeneous communities (see Alesina et 
al., 1999). An alternative explanation is that altruism travels less across racial and ethnic lines and members of 
one racial or ethnic group naturally dislike members of other groups. Moreover, there may be mistrust across 
groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) or pro-social group norms that are not 
easily enforceable across groups (Habyarimana et al., 2007).  
 Although there is much anecdotal evidence that strong ethnic antipathies among workers weaken their 
decision to participate in trade unions (see e.g. Lipset and Marks, 2000; Davis, 1988; Sombart, 1906), to the best 
of our knowledge the relationship between ethnic diversity and the participation in trade unions has not been 
investigated by the relevant literature. Since trade unions are also social groups that provide non-excludable 
benefits to every single worker (e.g. a wage increase) independently on whether he/she bearing the costs (see 
Olson, 1965), our analysis seeks to complement the relevant literature by placing the spotlight on this specific 
type of social group by investigating whether workers participate less in trade unions in ethnically fragmented 
societies. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Empirical analysis takes place in two layers exploiting exogenous variations in ethnic diversity across: (a) 
countries and (b) migrants from different countries within Europe.  
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3.1 Cross-Country analysis 
In this part of the analysis we rely on cross country data from 91 -developed and developing- countries and  
investigate the effect of ethnic and religious diversity on trade union density. 
 
3.1.1. Data and Empirical Strategy  
Two of the most well established measures of ethnic fractionalization at the country level are those developed 
by: (i) Alesina et al. (2003) and (ii) Fearon (2003).  The ethnic fractionalization measure developed by Alesina 
et al., (2003) [denoted as Ethnic (Alesina)] is an index reflecting the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in a country’s population belong to different ethnic groups. In other words, Ethnic (Alesina) equals 
to one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic groups’ shares, where the primary data on ethnic groups’ shares are 
obtained by the Atlas Narodov Mira, carried out by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s. Similarly, 
Fearon (2003) compiled an index of ethnic fractionalization [denoted as Ethnic (Fearon)] based on 822 different 
ethnic and “ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries. The primary sources for this measure are the CIA’s World 
Factbook, the Encyclopedia Britannica and, when possible, the relevant Library of Congress Country Study.
5
  
The analysis basically relies on these two alternative measures of ethnic fractionalization. However, in a battery 
of robustness checks we also employ: (i) the ethnic diversity measure developed by Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) [denoted as Ethnic (Montalvo)], (ii) the total number of distinct ethnic groups in a country’s 
population, as developed by Fearon (2003) [denoted as Number of ethnic groups(Fearon)], the number of major 
religions and ethno-religions per country compiled by Barrett et al. (2001) World Christian Encyclopaedia 
[denoted as Religion Diversity (Barrett)] and (iv) the religion fractionalization developed by Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005) [denoted as Religion Fractionalization (Montalvo)]. 
 Concerning the trade union density proxies, we employ two alternative measures. The first one -which 
ensures the maximum number of observations- is the trade union density compiled by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in the World Labour Report, whereas the second is the trade union density measure 
developed by Botero et al. (2004). Both these variables capture union membership as a proportion of the eligible 
workforce (i.e. non-agricultural labor force) and can be employed as indicators of the degree to which workers 
are organized. 
 The analysis relies on contemporary measures of trade union density and ethnic diversity that can be 
endogenous to a number of economic and political institutions. To address these potential endogeneity and 
omitted variable concerns, we instrument ethnic diversity on a set of epidemiological data that have been linked 
empirically to ethnic and religious diversity (see e.g. Cashdan, 2001; Fincher and Thornhill, 2008). More 
precisely, we employ as instruments the: (i) combined parasite stress (ii) non-zoo parasite stress developed by 
Fincher and Thornhill (2012) (iii) pathogen prevalence of infectious diseases  developed by Fincher and 
Thornhill (2008). 
                                                          
5 See Fearon (2003) for additional details on primary data sources and methodological assumptions of what defines a separate ethnic 
group. 
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Starting from McNeill (1974; 1980) and Diamond (1997), a large body of literature in social 
anthropology investigates how infectious diseases affect the structure of human communities and the cultural 
norms within communities across different times and places. More recently, a number of studies (see e.g. 
Fincher and Thornhill, 2014 for a review of this literature) place the spotlight on specific aspects of culture and 
investigate how infectious diseases affect the strength of family ties and religiosity (Fincher and Thornhill, 
2012), the individualism/collectivism dimension of culture (Murray and Schaller, 2010; Fincher et al., 2008) or 
ethnic and religion diversity (Cashdan, 2001; Fincher and Thornhill, 2008).
6
  
According to this literature and the so-called “parasite stress theory of sociality”, infectious diseases 
constitute a major source of morbidity and mortality along human history and hence human communities 
developed behavioral adaptations to defend against parasites (see Fincher and Thronhill, 2012; 2014). 
Behavioral adaptations (also described as behavioral immune system) basically consist of a number of 
ancestrally adaptive attitudes, social values and norms towards out-group and in-group members, unwillingness 
to interact with out-group people and prejudice against people perceived as unhealthy, contaminated or 
unclean.
7
 In other words, human communities developed a set of cultural norms and social values aiming to be 
protected by infectious diseases (see e.g. Fincher and Thornhill, 2014 for more details on this).
8
 Since 
contemporary cultural values are affected -at least in part- by the behavioral immune system developed by local 
communities over the centuries, we expect regions that are located in more lethal disease environments to be 
characterized by more collectivistic norms (i.e. in-group favoritism, stronger family ties etc) even nowadays.  
Focusing on issues related to ethnic fragmentation, Cashdan (2001) suggests that ethnic diversity is 
shaped chiefly by environmental factors and more precisely by: (i) unpredictable climate and (ii) high pathogen 
prevalence. Concerning the issue of  pathogen prevalence, Cashdan (2001) employs a composite index of 
pathogen stress -that takes into account the worldwide distribution of leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, 
schistosomes, filariae, spirochetes and leprosy- and provides empirical evidence in favor of a positive 
relationship between pathogen stress (i.e. infectious diseases) and ethnic diversity. More precisely the empirical 
analysis suggests that regions characterized by heavier pathogen stress are crowed by relatively more ethnic 
groups (that is they exhibit stronger ethnic diversity). This is because in these regions, human communities 
developed heavier habitat diversity and a more assortative sociality as a mean of protection against infectious 
                                                          
6 For instance Mc Neill (1974) suggested that castes in India initially formed, at least in part as a cultural response to local parasite stress. 
In other words, castes formed as a system of social values and behavior toward out-group and in-group members and prejudice against 
people perceived as unhealthy, contaminated or unclean.  
7 To be more precise, human communities developed chiefly two types of adaptation against parasites stress. The first one is the classical 
immune system that consists of biochemical, cellular and tissue-based adaptation, whereas the second one is the behavioral immune 
system, which is comprised by a set of cultural norms and social values aiming to protect the community from infectious diseases (see 
e.g. Fincher and Thornhill, 2012; 2014) 
8 A small but growing literature in economics builds on pathogen prevalence theory (see e.g. Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017; Kammas 
et al., 2017; Olsson and Paik, 2016) and employs epidemiological variables to instrument culture. The basic advantage of relying on 
instruments which are not economic in nature is that they ensure a sufficient source of exogenous variation for culture and related social 
values. 
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diseases, which as times goes by transformed to ethnic diversity. Similarly, Fincher and Thornhill (2008) 
provide evidence of a positive and significant relationship between infectious diseases and religion diversity.
9
 
 
3.1.2. Empirical specification 
The economic argument predicts that workers participate less in trade unions in more ethnically fragmented 
societies. Figure 1 shows indeed that countries characterized by strong ethnic and religious divisions, present 
lower levels of trade union density. The converse applies to countries characterized by stronger ethnic 
homogeneity.  
 These raw correlations may be rather informative but fail to control for a number of confounding factors 
and thus cannot be interpreted as causal relationships. To address these concerns, we employ the following basic 
econometric specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           (1) 
 
where i indexes for countries, Yi is trade union density, Ethnici is the measure of ethnic diversity, Xi is a vector 
of control variables and εi denotes the error term. The vector Xi includes commonly used controls such as GDP 
per capita, shares of the informal and agricultural sectors in the economy, employment in agriculture, 
unemployment, population, income inequality, democratic institutions and a set of dummy variables for 
continents, major religions and legal origins.  
 As we have already mentioned, on a battery of empirical estimations we instrument Ethnici on a set of 
epidemiological data that have been linked empirically to ethnic and religious diversity (see e.g. Cashdan, 2001; 
Fincher and Thornhill, 2008). 
 
3.2. Migrants from different countries within Europe 
The second part of the analysis explores the effect of ethnic diversity on the decision of a worker to participate 
in a trade union. In particular, our analysis builds on the empirical specification suggested by Luttmer and 
Singhal (2011) and employs a set of 6880 migrants from 116 countries of origin, residing in 32 European 
countries. It is established that higher levels of ethnic diversity in the country of origin are associated with lower 
levels of participation in trade unions.  
 
3.2.1. Data and Empirical Strategy 
The main objective of this part of the analysis is to investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on the decision of a 
worker to participate in a trade union. However, the decision of a worker to participate in a trade union 
inevitably reflects a large number of country characteristics such as the level of economic development, the 
economic and the political institutions of the country etc. In order to account for these characteristics, our 
                                                          
9  Other empirical studies that build upon the insights of biogeography in order to investigate the origins of ethnic and cultural 
fragmentation in contemporary national populations include Ashraf and Galor (2013), Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and Michalopoulos 
(2012).   
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analysis follows the empirical specification suggested by Luttmer and Singhal (2011) and places the spotlight on 
a set of 6,880 first generation migrants from 116 countries of origin, residing in 32 European countries. 
This approach allows us to account for a number of individual characteristics (such as age, gender, 
education, type of employment etc) but most importantly to introduce residence country fixed effects, which are 
able to account for a large number of characteristics of the residence country (such as economic and political 
institutions, culture etc). More precisely, we proceed by estimating the following empirical specification for 
immigrants’ decision to participate in a trade union:  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑏 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖           (2) 
 
where i indexes for individuals, Yi is a dummy variable that equals one whenever an immigrant worker is a 
member of a trade union in the country of residence and zero otherwise, Ethnicb is the measure of ethnic 
diversity in the birth country of the immigrant, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, θr is a fixed effect for 
residence country r of immigrant i and εi denotes the error term. We adjust standard errors to allow for 
clustering of the error term by birth country. The vector of individual characteristics Xi includes demographic 
characteristics such as age and gender, education, type of employment, sector of employment, political 
preferences etc. The residence country fixed effect θr captures the effect of economic and political institutions as 
well as potential cultural influences of the residence country.  
We employ individual data from the 5
th
 and 6
th
 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross- 
sectional survey conducted in a number of European countries. The analysis reports attitudes of N=6880 first 
generation migrants, who originate from 116 countries all over the world and have migrated in 32 European 
countries. Data on ethnic fractionalization are associated with the country of origin of the migrant and vary 
solely at the birth country level. Apparently, these data are identical to those employed in the cross-country 
analysis.  
Respondents are given the statement “Are you or have ever been a member of trade union or similar 
organization?” and the respondents answer by “Yes” or “No”. The ESS database also provides information 
about the age of the respondent, the gender, the highest level of education achieved, the type and the sector of 
employment, the religion denomination in which he/she belongs and the political preferences of the respondent. 
In order to control for a variety of potentially confounding factors we employ two alternative set of controls. 
The first one is identical to the set of explanatory variables employed by Schnabel and Wagner (2007) whereas 
the second is that used by Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent (2012), both of which investigate the decision to 
participate in trade unions.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
In this section, we examine whether the data implies a relationship between ethnic diversity and trade union 
density. First, we present empirical results using a core set of explanatory variables [Tables 1a and 1b]. Then we 
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inquire into the robustness of our empirical findings by employing extended sets of controls and alternative 
diversity and trade union measures [Tables 2, 3 and 4]. Finally, we investigate whether the above-mentioned 
relationship survives when our analysis relies on micro data [Tables 5 and 6]. 
 
4.1 The effect of ethnic diversity on trade union density: Baseline results 
Table 1a presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure 
developed by ILO as dependent variable and the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) as 
key explanatory variable. More precisely, columns (1)-(3) present the simple OLS estimates and columns (4)-
(12) the 2SLS estimates where Ethnic (Alesina) is instrumented on the: (i) combined parasite stress measure 
developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) [see columns (4)-(6)], (ii) pathogen prevalence of infectious 
diseases measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) [see columns (7)-(9)] and (iii) non-zoo parasite 
stress index compiled by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) [see columns (10)-(12)]. In most empirical specifications 
we control for continental fixed effects whereas in Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) we also control for the level of 
economic development by employing the log of gdp per capita in 2005 (taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators).  
 
[Table 1a, here] 
 
We see that Ethnic (Alesina) enters with a negative, highly significant and large coefficient in all 
alternative OLS estimates as well as in the second stage of 2SLS estimates. Specifically, a one-standard 
deviation difference in ethnic diversity between two countries implies 16.5% lower trade union density in the 
country with the higher diversity, indicating a quantitatively important effect (see column (6)). Obtained 
empirical findings are in accordance with the predictions of the theory (see e.g. Alesina and la Ferrara, 2000; 
Lipset and Marks, 2000) highlighting the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and trade unions’ 
density. Moreover, focusing on the empirical results of the first stage, our analysis is in line with Cashdan 
(2001) suggesting that countries characterized by heavier parasite stress present higher levels of ethnic diversity. 
 
[Table 1b, here] 
 
Table 1b replicates the estimation of Equation (1) by employing identical empirical specifications to 
those presented in Table 1a and employing the ethnic diversity measure developed by Fearon (2003) as a key 
explanatory variable. Specifically, just as in Table 1a, columns (1)-(3) present the OLS estimates, whereas 
columns (4)-(12) include the results from the 2SLS estimates when Ethnic (Fearon) is instrumented on parasite 
stress and pathogen prevalence data. As can be seen, in all alternative specifications Ethnic (Fearon) bears a 
negative and highly significant coefficient, which is in line with the economic argument suggesting that ethnic 
diversity is negatively correlated with trade unions. Moreover, if ethnic fractionalization is higher by one-
standard deviation in a country relative to another, the trade union density of the former is predicted to be 16% 
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lower than the latter (see column (6)), in line with the results using Ethnic (Alesina). In addition, placing the 
spotlight on the first stage, we observe that obtained empirical findings are in accordance with the “parasite 
stress theory of values and sociality” suggesting that countries located in more fatal disease environment present 
stronger ethnic divisions. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
In turn, we inquire into the robustness of the obtained empirical results by employing extended sets of controls 
as well as alternative diversity and trade union measures. To this end, Table 2 presents 2SLS estimates of 
Equation (1) using an extended set of explanatory variables that allows to account for a battery of potential 
confounding factors. More precisely, in columns (1) and (6) we control for a number of structural economic 
characteristics -such as the share of the informal sector in the economy, the share of the agricultural sector and 
total employment in agriculture -that may influence the participation of workers in trade unions. In columns (2) 
and (7), we further extend our set of covariates by accounting in addition for unemployment, economic 
inequality and total population whereas in columns (3) and (8) we also account for political institutions. Finally, 
in columns (4) and (9) we control for major religions and in columns (5) and (10) for country legal origins. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
 Table 2 presents the empirical results obtained in the second stage when in the first stage we employ as 
instrument the combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012).
10
 We see that both 
Ethnic (Alesina) and Ethnic (Fearon) enter with negative significant and large coefficients in all alternative 
specifications highlighting the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and the participation in trade 
unions. Specifically, countries which differ by a one-standard deviation in terms of ethnic diversity are predicted 
to exhibit 8.4% (Ethnic (Alesina)) and 7.2% (Ethnic (Fearon)) difference in terms of union density in the most 
complete specification (columns (5) and (10)). These are smaller than the baseline estimates (around 16%), but 
at the same time more reasonable and still quantitatively important indicating differences of around one-third of 
the mean union density. As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned, the share of agriculture bears a 
negative and significant coefficient indicating that economies characterized by larger agricultural sectors present 
lower trade union density. Similarly, economic inequality enters with a negative and significant coefficient in 
most specifications. This puzzling -at a first glance- empirical finding could be explained by taking into account 
that low-skilled workers working with limited duration contracts (or no contract at all) usually abstain from 
participating in trade unions (see Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent (2012) for more details on this). Therefore 
                                                          
10 We note that obtained empirical findings remain qualitatively intact when we employ as instruments the pathogen prevalence as well 
as the non-zoo parasite stress measures. Results are available upon request.  
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countries characterized by more heterogeneous labor force (i.e. stronger divisions between low-skilled/ high-
skilled workers) and hence higher income inequality are expected to exhibit lower trade union density.
11
 
 
[Table 3, here] 
 
 In Table 3 we inquire into the robustness of our empirical results by employing alternative ethnic and 
religion diversity measures. More precisely, Table 3 replicates the empirical estimations of Table 2 when we 
employ as key explanatory variables: (i) ethnic diversity measure developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) [denoted as Ethnic (Montalvo)] (columns (1)-(3)), (ii) the total number of distinct ethnic groups in a 
country’s population, as developed by Fearon (2003) [denoted as Number of ethnic groups(Fearon)] (columns 
(4)-(6)), the number of major religions and ethno-religions per country compiled by Barrett et al., (2001) World 
Christian Encyclopaedia [denoted as Religion Diversity (Barrett)] (columns (7)-(9)) and (iv) the religion 
fractionalization developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) [denoted as Religion Fractionalization 
(Montalvo)] (columns (10)-(12)). As before, Table 3 presents the empirical results obtained in the second stage 
when in the first stage we employ as instrument the combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and 
Thornhill (2012). As can be seen, all four alternative ethnic and religious fractionalization measures bear 
negative and significant coefficients highlighting the negative relationship between ethnic (or religious) 
diversity and the participation in trade unions and providing evidence that our empirical findings are not 
sensitive to the ethnic (or religious) diversity measure employed. Concerning the rest of the covariates, 
empirical results remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 2.  
 
[Table 4, here] 
 
 Finally, in Table 4 we inquire into the robustness of our findings by replicating the empirical 
estimations of Table 2 using as dependent variable the trade union density measure developed by Botero et., al 
(2004) [denoted as Trade Union (Botero)]. Employing this measure implies a significant drop in the size of our 
sample that now equals to maximum 64 observations. As before, we present empirical findings of the second 
stage when we employ as instrument for ethnic diversity in the first stage the combined parasite stress measure 
compiled by Fincher and Thornhill (2012). As can be verified, once again both Ethnic (Alesina) and Ethnic 
(Fearon) enter with negative and highly significant coefficients in all alternative specifications. The predicted 
differences in terms of trade union density are in line with those using Trade Union Density developed by the 
ILO (13.5% and 10.7% for Ethnic (Alesina) and Ethnic (Fearon) respectively). These empirical findings 
provide further evidence in favor of a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and trade union 
density.  
 
                                                          
11 The empirical results of the first stage remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Tables 1a and 1b. All empirical findings are 
available upon request.  
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4.3 The effect of ethnic diversity in the birth country on the decision to participate in trade unions 
In Table 5 we investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on the decision to participate in trade unions. 
More precisely, we proceed by presenting Probit estimates of Equation (2), using data for a sample of N=6880 
first generation migrants in Europe who originate from 116 different countries. Individual-level data are 
obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS), whereas the data on ethnic diversity are identical to those 
employed in the cross-country analysis and vary solely at the birth country (of the migrant) level. We follow the 
empirical specification suggested by Luttmer and Singhal (2011), which allows us to introduce residence 
country fixed effects and hence to control for a battery of confounding factors that vary at the residence country 
level (such as economic and political institutions or culture). Finally, we account for a number of individual 
characteristics (such as age, gender, level of education, type of employment etc) by employing a set of 
covariates identical to those employed by Schnabel and Wagner (2007). 
 
[Table 5, here] 
 
Specifically, column (1) presents Probit estimates of Equation (2) when the set of covariates include 
solely the ethnic diversity at the birth country of the migrant [denoted as Ethnic Alesina (birth country)] and 
residence country fixed effects. In turn, in column (2) the set of controls is extended so as to include a battery of 
individual characteristics, whereas in column (3) we also account for the level of development by introducing 
gdp per capita at the birth country of the migrant [denoted as gdp per capita (birth country)]. As can seen in all 
three alternative specifications Ethnic Alesina (birth country) enters with a negative and highly significant 
coefficient highlighting the negative effect of increased ethnic diversity in the country of origin on the decision 
of a worker to participate in trade unions. In columns (4)-(6) we replicate the empirical estimations of columns 
(1)-(3) by employing as key explanatory variable the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Fearon (2003) at the 
birth country of the migrant [denoted as Ethnic Fearon (birth country)]. Once again, Ethnic Fearon (birth 
country) bears a negative and significant coefficient providing further evidence of a negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity in the country of origin and the decision of a worker to participate in trade unions.  
As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned, our empirical findings are in line with previous 
empirical studies (see e.g. Schnabel and Wagner, 2007; Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent, 2012). Specifically, Age 
exerts a non-linear, inverse U-shaped effect on the decision to participate in trade unions, whereas the level of 
education [denoted as Education Low/High], the establishment size of the firm and the political preferences of 
the worker [denoted as Left-Right Scale] appear to be significant factors which influence the participation 
decision. Finally, the type of employment of the father bears a negative and significant coefficient indicating 
that workers coming from families, in which the father was self-employed tend to participate less in trade 
unions.  
 
[Table 6, here] 
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In Table 6 we inquire into the robustness of our obtained empirical results by replicating the empirical 
estimations of Table 5 using a set of explanatory variables identical to that employed by Kirmanoğlu and 
Başlevent (2012). We see that once again Ethnic Alesina (birth country) and Ethnic Fearon (birth country) enter 
with negative and significant coefficients providing further evidence of a negative relationship between ethnic 
diversity in the country of origin and the decision of a worker to participate in trade unions. Concerning the rest 
of the controls, our empirical findings remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 5 and they are 
also in line with previous empirical studies examining similar issues (see e.g. Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent, 2012). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
This paper seeks to investigate the hypothesis that workers participate less in trade unions in more ethnically 
fragmented societies. The empirical analysis takes place in two layers exploiting exogenous variations in ethnic 
diversity across: (a) countries and (b) migrants from different countries within Europe.  
More precisely, in the first layer the analysis proceeds by placing the spotlight on a dataset of 91 -
developed and developing- countries and investigating the effect of ethnic and religious diversity on trade union 
density. To address the usual endogeneity and omitted variable concerns -driven by the fact that both ethnic 
diversity and trade union density may be endogenous to economic and political institutions- our analysis 
employs a set of innovative instruments derived from biogeography, which have been linked empirically to 
ethnic and religious diversity (see e.g. Cashdan, 2001; Fincher and Thornhill, 2008).  
In turn, our analysis investigates the above mentioned hypothesis by using the European Social Survey 
(ESS) dataset and in particular a sample of first generation migrants residing in ESS countries. Consistent with 
the prediction of the theory (see e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Lipset and Marks, 2000) both layers of the 
empirical analysis provide evidence of a strong, negative and highly significant relationship between ethnic 
diversity and the decision of the workers to participate in trade unions. Obtained empirical findings remain 
highly robust across a battery of alternative empirical specifications and estimation techniques. 
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Figure 1: Ethnic Diversity and Trade Union Density 
Panel A Panel B 
  
Panel C Panel D 
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Table 1a: The effect of ethnic diversity on trade union density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Second Stage,  Dependent variable: Trade Union Density 
  
 
 
            OLS              
OLS 
OLS 
2SLS (Combined Parasite Stress) 
 
 
IV1 
IV1 
2SLS (Pathogen Prevalence) 
IV2 
IV2 
2SLS (Non Zoo Parasite Stress) 
Ethnic (Alesina) -0.324*** -0.285*** -0.226*** -0.586*** -0.649*** -0.646*** -0.602*** -0.688*** -0.740*** -0.564*** -0.593*** -0.569*** 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.081) (0.093) (0.124) (0.167) (0.103) (0.139) (0.235) (0.093) (0.118) (0.173) 
GDP per capita   0.036   0.001   -0.010   0.005 
   (0.022)   (0.028)   (0.034)   (0.028) 
First Stage: the instrumented variable is Ethnic (Alesina) 
 Combined Parasite Stress    0.062*** 0.058*** 0.070***       
    (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)       
Pathogen Prevalence       0.025*** 0.021*** 0.022***    
       (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)    
Non Zoo Parasite Stress          0.090*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 
          (0.008) (0. 009) (0.011) 
F-stat (1
st 
Stage)    123.8 60.02 56.79 95.38 44.31 32.24 123.10 61.68 53.30 
Continent dummies  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Observations 91 91 91 90 90 90 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R
2
 0.174 0.265 0.287          
Notes: The table presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure developed by ILO as dependent variable and the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Alesina et al., (2003) as key 
explanatory variable. Columns (1)-(3) present the simple OLS estimates and columns (4)-(12) the 2SLS estimates when Ethnic (Alesina) is instrumented on the: (i) combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) 
[columns (4)-(6)], (ii) pathogen prevalence of infectious diseases measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) [see columns (7)-(9)] and (iii) non-zoo parasite stress index compiled by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) [see columns (10)-
(12)]. The set of continent dummies includes a fixed effect for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, North America and Latin America .Columns (3),(6),(9) and (12) also account for the level of 
economic development by employing the log of gdp per capita in 2005 (taken from World Bank Development Indicators). The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 1b: The effect of ethnic diversity on trade union density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Second Stage,  Dependent variable: Trade Union Density 
  
 
 
            OLS              
OLS 
OLS 
2SLS (Combined Parasite Stress) 
 
 
IV1 
IV1 
2SLS (Pathogen Prevalence) 
IV2 
IV2 
2SLS (Non Zoo Parasite Stress) 
Ethnic (Fearon) -0.260*** -0.203*** -0.163** -0.501*** -0.636*** -0.609*** -0.561*** -0.736*** -0.766*** -0.499*** -0.582*** -0.538*** 
 (0.064) (0.074) (0.078) (0.097) (0.156) (0.185) (0.118) (0.199) (0.291) (0.101) (0.147) (0.184) 
GDP per capita   0.035   0.005   -0.005   0.010 
   (0.023)   (0.029)   (0.037)   (0.029) 
First Stage: the instrumented variable is Ethnic (Fearon) 
Combined Parasite Stress    0.064*** 0.056*** 0.073***       
    (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)       
Pathogen Prevalence       0.025*** 0.018*** 0.020***    
       (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)    
Non Zoo Parasite Stress          0.091*** 0.074*** 0.088*** 
          (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
F-stat (1
st 
Stage)    108.2 37.72 47.50 78.49 25.00 20.36 102.3 42.46 50.13 
Continent dummies  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
R
2
 0.126 0.208 0.229          
Notes: The table presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure developed by ILO as dependent variable and the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Fearon (2003) as key explanatory 
variable. Columns (1)-(3) present the simple OLS estimates and columns (4)-(12) the 2SLS estimates when Ethnic (Fearon) is instrumented on the: (i) combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) [columns (4)-
(6)], (ii) pathogen prevalence of infectious diseases measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) [see columns (7)-(9)] and (iii) non-zoo parasite stress index compiled by Fincher and Thornhill (2012) [see columns (10)-(12)]. The set of 
continent dummies includes fixed effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, North America and Latin America. Columns (3),(6),(9) and (12) also account for the level of economic 
development by employing the log of gdp per capita in 2005 (taken from World Bank Development Indicators). The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 2: The effect of ethnic diversity on trade union density: Full set of controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Second Stage,  Dependent variable: Trade Union Density 
 
 2SLS (Instrument: Combined Parasite Stress) 
Ethnic (Alesina) -0.604*** -0.385*** -0.405*** -0.301** -0.330**      
 (0.184) (0.137) (0.141) (0.127) (0.134)      
Ethnic (Fearon)      -0.505*** -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.246** -0.272** 
      (0.170) (0.135) (0.132) (0.111) (0.117) 
GDP per capita 0.035 0.004 -0.012 -0.040 -0.051 0.029 -0.008 0.002 -0.016 -0.027 
 (0.056) (0.043) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.056) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) 
GDP Informal 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employment in Agriculture 0.003* 0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Agriculture Share -0.438 -1.070*** -1.135*** -1.277*** -1.395*** -0.530 -1.070** -1.077** -1.109*** -1.241*** 
 (0.431) (0.410) (0.408) (0.337) (0.338) (0.417) (0.436) (0.433) (0.371) (0.371) 
Unemployment  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Population  -0.052* -0.026 -0.002 0.002  -0.005 -0.006 0.027 0.026 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030)  (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) 
Inequality  -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009***  -0.008*** -0.008** -0.006** -0.007** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Democracy   -0.003 -0.004 -0.006   -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)   (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
           
Continent dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Religion    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Legal Origins      ✓      ✓ 
Observations 80 78 75 75 75 73 71 71 71 71 
F-stat (1
st 
Stage) 30.59 37.25 32.96 29.99 29.82 33.78 34.68 32.62 30.39 34.66 
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure developed by ILO as dependent variable and the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Alesina et al., (2003) [columns 
(1)-(5)] and Fearon, (2003) [columns (6)-(10)] as key explanatory variables. More precisely, the Table presents empirical results obtained in the second stage when in the first stage we employ as instrument for ethnic diversity the 
combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012). The set of continent dummies includes fixed effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, North 
America and Latin America. The set of legal origins dummies includes affixed effect for British legal origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and French origin.  Finally, the set of major religions controls for the share of 
Protestant, Muslim, Catholic and other religions in the population. The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) 
denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 3: Robustness [Alternative Ethnic and Religion Diversity Measures] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Second Stage,  Dependent variable: Trade Union Density 
 
 
 
 
 2SLS (Instrument: Combined Parasite Stress) 
Ethnic (Montalvo) -0.441*** -0.372** -0.335**          
 (0.148) (0.170) (0.168)          
Number of Ethnic Groups (Fearon)    -0.462** -0.236** -0.174**       
    (0.188) (0.094) (0.085)       
Number of Religions (Barret)       -0.122*** -0.105*** -0.087**    
       (0.036) (0.039) (0.037)    
Religion Fractionalization  (Montalvo)          -0.776** -0.603** -0.491** 
          (0.366) (0.267) (0.218) 
GDP per capita 0.020 -0.041 -0.066 0.014 -0.012 -0.036 0.011 0.003 -0.036 0.021 0.008 -0.043 
 (0.026) (0.069) (0.069) (0.034) (0.068) (0.064) (0.025) (0.056) (0.051) (0.032) (0.053) (0.052) 
             
Controls             
Continent dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Religion   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Legal Origins   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Observations 80 67 67 81 71 71 89 74 74 80 67 67 
F-stat (1
st 
Stage) 36.18 14.85 11.31 10.53 13.33 11.43 57.85 35.84 32.89 8.138 10.08 13.43 
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure developed by ILO as dependent variable and ethnic fractionalization measure developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
[columns (1)-(3)],  the total number of distinct ethnic groups developed by Fearon, (2003) [columns (4)-(6)], the number of major religions and ethno-religions per country compiled by Barrett et al., (2001) [columns (7)-(9)] and the religion 
fractionalization developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) [ columns (10)-(12)] as key explanatory variables. More precisely, the Table presents empirical results obtained in the second stage when in the first stage we employ as 
instrument for ethnic diversity the combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012). The set of continent dummies includes fixed effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and 
Pacific, North America and Latin America. The set of legal origins dummies includes fixed effects for British legal origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and French origin. Finally, the set of major religions controls for the share of Protestant, 
Muslim, Catholic and other religions in the population. Vector Xi includes the standard set of controls employed in Table 2 (i.e. GDP Informal, Employment in Agriculture, Agriculture Share, Unemployment, Population, Inequality, Democracy). The F-
stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 4: Robustness [Alternative Dependent Variable] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Second Stage,  Dependent variable: Trade Union Density [Botero et al., 2004] 
 
 2SLS (Instrument: Combined Parasite Stress) 
Ethnic (Alesina) -0.967*** -0.610*** -0.609*** -0.469** -0.528**      
 (0.360) (0.212) (0.211) (0.192) (0.212)      
Ethnic (Fearon)      -0.745*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.370*** -0.407*** 
      (0.249) (0.166) (0.165) (0.142) (0.153) 
GDP per capita 0.011 0.038 0.036 0.024 -0.020 0.057 0.064 0.065 0.050 0.015 
 (0.097) (0.084) (0.088) (0.079) (0.089) (0.077) (0.080) (0.086) (0.079) (0.084) 
GDP Informal 0.008 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.011** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Employment in Agriculture 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Agriculture Share -0.544 -1.240 -1.233 -1.307 -1.741** -0.545 -1.100 -1.104 -1.084 -1.519** 
 (0.821) (0.890) (0.875) (0.887) (0.842) (0.649) (0.823) (0.810) (0.839) (0.770) 
Unemployment  -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004  -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Population  -0.178*** -0.179*** -0.150*** -0.136***  -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.119*** -0.108*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Inequality  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008*  -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Democracy   0.001 -0.006 -0.007   -0.000 -0.007 -0.008 
   (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)   (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Continent dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Religion    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Legal Origins     ✓     ✓ 
Observations 64 61 61 61 61 62 59 59 59 59 
F-stat (1
st 
Stage) 13.63 22.21 20.87 20.12 19.90 23.69 30.59 28.72 27.61 25.98 
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates of Equation (1), when we employ the Trade Union Density measure developed by Botero et al., (2004) as dependent variable and the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Alesina et al., 
(2003) [columns (1)-(5)] and Fearon, (2003) [columns (6)-(10)] as key explanatory variables. More precisely, the Table presents empirical results obtained in the second stage when in the first stage we employ as instrument for 
ethnic diversity the combined parasite stress measure developed by Fincher and Thornhill (2012). The set of continent dummies includes fixed effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and 
Pacific, North America and Latin America. The set of legal origin dummies includes fixed effects for British legal origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and French origin.  Finally, the set of major religions controls for the share 
of Protestant, Muslim, Catholic and other religions in the population. The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, 
*) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 5: Factors influencing the probability of union membership [Schnabel and Wagner (2007) set of controls] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ethnic Alesina (birth country) -0.614*** -0.368** -0.396**    
 (0.157) (0.167) (0.194)    
Ethnic Fearon (birth country)    -0.535*** -0.334** -0.366** 
    (0.136) (0.150) (0.173) 
Gdp per capita (birth country)   -0.001   -0.001 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Age  0.080*** 0.081***  0.080*** 0.080*** 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Age square  -0.057*** -0.057***  -0.056*** -0.056*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Gender  -0.049 -0.049  -0.028 -0.027 
  (0.061) (0.061)  (0.058) (0.058) 
Education Low  -0.139*** -0.140***  -0.118** -0.119** 
  (0.053) (0.053)  (0.049) (0.048) 
Education High  0.005 0.006  0.017 0.018 
  (0.057) (0.057)  (0.058) (0.058) 
Part Time worker  -0.037 -0.036  -0.046 -0.046 
  (0.059) (0.059)  (0.059) (0.060) 
Establishment Size (<10)  0.237*** 0.236***  0.234*** 0.233*** 
  (0.083) (0.082)  (0.084) (0.084) 
Establishment Size (25> and <99)  0.437*** 0.437***  0.437*** 0.437*** 
  (0.073) (0.073)  (0.074) (0.074) 
Establishment Size (100> and <499)  0.579*** 0.579***  0.577*** 0.577*** 
  (0.074) (0.074)  (0.073) (0.073) 
Establishment Size (>500)  0.585*** 0.585***  0.587*** 0.587*** 
  (0.071) (0.071)  (0.070) (0.070) 
Left-Right Scale  -0.042*** -0.042***  -0.041*** -0.041*** 
  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Member of Religion  0.032 0.030  0.040 0.037 
  (0.059) (0.061)  (0.060) (0.062) 
Father Education Low  0.041 0.041  0.049 0.050 
  (0.053) (0.053)  (0.054) (0.054) 
Mother Education Low  0.071 0.068  0.053 0.050 
  (0.054) (0.051)  (0.053) (0.049) 
Father Self Employed  -0.107*** -0.107***  -0.106*** -0.106*** 
  (0.037) (0.037)  (0.039) (0.039) 
ESS round 0.003 0.027 0.026 0.005 0.030 0.029 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.046) (0.031) (0.046) (0.046) 
Residence country dummies (32) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 6,880 4,022 4,022 6,777 3,955 3,955 
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth countries are in parentheses. The dependent variable is ever union membership. 
Column (1) presents Probit estimates of Equation (2) when the set of covariates include solely the ethnic diversity at the birth country of the 
migrant [denoted as Ethnic Alesina (birth country)] and residence country fixed effects. In turn, in column (2) the set of controls is extended so as 
to include a battery of individual characteristics whereas in column (3) we also account for the level of development by introducing gdp per 
capita at the birth country of the migrant [denoted as gdp per capita (birth country)]. In columns (4)-(6) we replicate the empirical estimations of 
columns (1)-(3) by employing as key explanatory variable the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Fearon (2003) in the birth country of the 
migrant [denoted as Ethnic Fearon (birth country)]. Individual data are obtained by the 5
th
 and 6
th
 rounds of European Social Survey (ESS).*** (**, 
*) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 6: Factors influencing the probability of union membership [Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent (2012) set of 
controls] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ethnic Alesina (birth country) -0.614*** -0.508*** -0.597***    
 (0.157) (0.154) (0.162)    
Ethnic Fearon (birth country)    -0.535*** -0.453*** -0.523*** 
    (0.136) (0.153) (0.158) 
GDP per capita (birth country)   -0.003   -0.003 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Age  0.084*** 0.084***  0.084*** 0.084*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Age square  -0.061*** -0.061***  -0.061*** -0.061*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Gender  -0.194*** -0.192***  -0.174*** -0.173*** 
  (0.068) (0.067)  (0.065) (0.065) 
Education Low  -0.141*** -0.143***  -0.127*** -0.130*** 
  (0.050) (0.049)  (0.049) (0.048) 
Education High  -0.064 -0.061  -0.056 -0.053 
  (0.059) (0.059)  (0.060) (0.060) 
Left-Right Scale  -0.034*** -0.033***  -0.031*** -0.031*** 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Religiosity  0.008 0.007  0.008 0.007 
  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Type of Employment       
Central Government  0.366* 0.365*  0.386* 0.385* 
  (0.214) (0.214)  (0.219) (0.219) 
Public Sector  0.476* 0.478*  0.504** 0.506** 
  (0.251) (0.251)  (0.254) (0.254) 
State owned enterprise  0.267 0.267  0.280 0.280 
  (0.290) (0.289)  (0.297) (0.297) 
Private Sector  -0.090 -0.091  -0.061 -0.062 
  (0.268) (0.268)  (0.272) (0.272) 
Self Employed  -0.574** -0.572**  -0.541* -0.539* 
  (0.277) (0.277)  (0.276) (0.276) 
Establishment Size (<10)  0.090 0.089  0.090 0.088 
  (0.090) (0.090)  (0.091) (0.091) 
Establishment Size (25> and <99)  0.198** 0.198**  0.193** 0.193** 
  (0.081) (0.081)  (0.082) (0.082) 
Establishment Size (100> and <499)  0.395*** 0.394***  0.397*** 0.396*** 
  (0.068) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.067) 
Establishment Size (>500)  0.337*** 0.336***  0.344*** 0.345*** 
  (0.069) (0.070)  (0.070) (0.070) 
Sector of Employment       
Mining  0.336 0.336  0.277 0.276 
  (0.269) (0.268)  (0.275) (0.273) 
Manufacturing  0.177*** 0.178***  0.170*** 0.171*** 
  (0.055) (0.055)  (0.055) (0.055) 
Energy  -0.166 -0.166  -0.152 -0.150 
  (0.174) (0.173)  (0.174) (0.174) 
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Construction  0.184 0.186  0.147 0.148 
  (0.127) (0.127)  (0.125) (0.124) 
Trade  0.060 0.061  0.049 0.050 
  (0.074) (0.074)  (0.074) (0.074) 
Transportation  0.242** 0.246**  0.233** 0.236** 
  (0.105) (0.105)  (0.105) (0.105) 
Communication  -0.299* -0.294*  -0.319* -0.315* 
  (0.163) (0.163)  (0.168) (0.168) 
Finance  -0.044 -0.041  -0.036 -0.033 
  (0.133) (0.133)  (0.132) (0.132) 
Public Administration  -0.021 -0.019  -0.005 -0.003 
  (0.118) (0.118)  (0.120) (0.120) 
Education  0.073 0.079  0.081 0.087 
  (0.088) (0.088)  (0.089) (0.089) 
Health  0.212** 0.213**  0.202** 0.202** 
  (0.098) (0.099)  (0.098) (0.098) 
Other  -0.051 -0.048  -0.077 -0.076 
  (0.116) (0.116)  (0.118) (0.117) 
Unlimited duration Contract  0.313*** 0.313***  0.317*** 0.316*** 
  (0.096) (0.096)  (0.097) (0.097) 
Limited duration contract  0.111 0.108  0.103 0.100 
  (0.093) (0.093)  (0.093) (0.093) 
ESS round 0.003 -0.008 -0.007 0.005 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.030) (0.045) (0.045) (0.031) (0.046) (0.046) 
Residence country dummies (32) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 6,880 4,324 4,323 6,777 4,258 4,257 
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth countries are in parentheses. The dependent variable is ever union membership. 
Column (1) presents Probit estimates of Equation (2) when the set of covariates include solely the ethnic diversity in the birth country of the 
migrant [denoted as Ethnic Alesina (birth country)] and residence country fixed effects. In turn, in column (2) the set of controls is extended so 
as to include a battery of individual characteristics whereas in column (3) we also account for the level of development by introducing gdp per 
capita at the birth country of the migrant [denoted as gdp per capita (birth country)]. In columns (4)-(6) we replicate the empirical estimations 
of columns (1)-(3) by employing as key explanatory variable the ethnic diversity measure compiled by Fearon (2003) in the birth country of the 
migrant [denoted as Ethnic Fearon (birth country)]. Individual data are obtained by the 5
th
 and 6
th
 rounds of European Social Survey (ESS).*** 
(**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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